SEA Thoughts

Digital ID in South East Asia

Singapore: Is implementing biometric authentication at Changi Airport, allowing travelers to pass through checkpoints without a physical passport.



Indonesia: Plans to implement a "Digital Population Identity" that will function as a digital ID wallet for storing identity-related documents by late 2024.


Brunei: Began issuing smart identity cards at the end of 2024 and uses the e-Darussalam portal for online government services.


Malaysia: Has a national initiative called MyDigital to become a digital-driven economy and is working on a "single government window" with MyDigital ID under its 13MP plan.


Thailand: Is also implementing digital identity systems, though the specific agendas and levels of implementation vary across the region.


Vietnam: Grants digital ID accounts to foreign residents, requiring them to register with their passport and provide biometric data for verification.


Philippines: Is also planning or building digital ID systems, along with countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka, which are developing national digital ID systems.




Based on experiences from countries with digital ID systems, here are elaborations on the potential risks and negative impacts identified by civil liberties groups, privacy advocates, and impacted citizens.




Actual examples of government digital ID systems being abused to violate civil liberties or exclude citizens have occurred in countries such as India and the Dominican Republic. While some nations, like Estonia, have been more successful in implementation, even they have experienced security vulnerabilities. Concerns persist globally about the risks of increased surveillance, hacking, and marginalization associated with digital ID programs.



India: Aadhaar program

India's Aadhaar is the world's largest biometric digital ID system, with records for over 1.2 billion people.

Marginalization of the poor: In 2022, rights groups highlighted that the program was used as a tool of exclusion. It effectively disenfranchised an estimated 2 million people who could not access social services and benefits due to technological illiteracy or issues with biometric verification.



Vulnerability to hackers: The centralized database has been the subject of repeated data breaches, with cybercriminals selling records on the illicit market. In 2023, data from Aadhaar and COVID-19 health records was leaked, affecting over 800 million citizens.



Function creep: Privacy advocates have criticized the potential for function creep, where the ID system is expanded beyond its initial purpose. For example, the system has been linked to the financial and healthcare sectors, increasing the potential for surveillance and abuse.



Dominican Republic: Haitian exclusion

The digital ID system in the Dominican Republic has been criticized for fueling the retroactive exclusion of people of Haitian descent from the civil registry.

The system was used to deny official identification to residents of Haitian descent, effectively leaving them stateless and without access to government services.



Kenya: Centralization of databases

In Kenya, the government integrated numerous state and private identification databases to improve the efficiency of services.

However, combining extensive data on citizens' social, economic, and political activities in a centralized repository raises concerns about privacy infringement, heightened surveillance, and misuse.



China: Social credit system

In China, state-issued smart cards are used to track and analyze an individual's transactions and interactions with the government.

Behavioral control: The data collected is used to build the country's social credit system, which can be used to monitor and control citizens' behavior.



Estonia: Pioneering but vulnerable

Estonia is considered a pioneer in digital identity with its e-Estonia platform, but it has not been immune to problems.

Security flaws: In 2017, a vulnerability was discovered that put over 750,000 ID cards at risk of identity theft. Estonia's ability to fix the flaw was key to overcoming this incident and maintaining trust.

Third-party abuse: Even without a major technological breach, the primary instances of misuse have occurred when individuals voluntarily gave access to their electronic ID to friends or relatives.






Reasons for international cooperation

Preventing a "race to the bottom" on privacy: If some countries adopt mandatory digital ID with minimal privacy protections, it could create pressure for other nations to follow suit in order to maintain competitiveness in trade and digital services. International collaboration could establish global standards for privacy and data protection, preventing a "race to the bottom" where citizens' rights are eroded.

Addressing global initiatives: The push for digital ID is not confined to individual nations. International bodies like the World Bank (through its ID4D program) and the UN have initiatives to promote and develop digital identity systems, including in developing countries. Human rights groups like Access Now and the Immigrant Defense Project argue that challenging these programs requires coordinated international opposition.



Tackling cross-border interoperability: As digital ID systems become more commonplace, there is increasing pressure for them to be interoperable across borders, particularly for commerce, travel, and financial transactions. Without international pressure, this interoperability could lead to the large-scale sharing of personal data with varying privacy standards, creating security risks and enabling surveillance across jurisdictions.



Building a united front against authoritarianism: The misuse of digital ID in countries like China, where it is linked to a social credit system, is seen as a chilling example of what can happen when such technology is combined with a repressive state. Coordinated international resistance could act as a deterrent to other authoritarian regimes and prevent the normalization of such practices.



Learning from past failures: Many countries are pushing forward with digital ID despite documented evidence of failure and abuse in other nations, such as India's Aadhaar program, which has led to exclusion and breaches. International cooperation allows groups to share research and best practices, and to highlight these failures to prevent repeating the same mistakes elsewhere.



Resisting corporate influence: The development of digital ID often involves partnerships with large technology companies, which some fear could lead to the control of citizen data being outsourced to private corporations that are not publicly accountable. An international movement could provide a counterbalance to the lobbying power of these corporations.



Methods for international opposition

A strategy of international opposition could involve several tactics:

Coordinated advocacy campaigns: Civil liberties and human rights organizations can run joint campaigns to raise awareness about the risks of digital ID in multiple countries at once, amplifying their message.



Influencing international standards: Lobbying international bodies that promote digital ID, such as the World Bank, to incorporate strong human rights protections and a right to non-participation could mitigate some of the risks.

Creating legal frameworks: Countries could work together to pass legislation that explicitly protects the right to not use digital ID and prevents it from being made mandatory.



Supporting activists abroad: Providing funding, resources, and solidarity to activists and organizations opposing digital ID in more repressive regimes can strengthen their ability to resist.

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